Jo Van Bulck
Belgian researcher who has spent his career showing that Intel's SGX enclaves keep secrets rather less well than the box claims.
As a PhD student at KU Leuven, Van Bulck built SGX-Step in 2017, a framework that lets an attacker with kernel access run an enclave one instruction at a time. Under that microscope, side channels that had been theoretical suddenly became practical.
In 2018 he co-discovered Foreshadow (Intel's L1TF), a Meltdown cousin that read SGX enclave memory and even their attestation keys. LVI followed in 2020, running speculative execution in reverse: instead of leaking data, it injected it. He also worked on Plundervolt, where undervolting the CPU made enclaves miscalculate. Intel answered with microcode, compiler flags and, eventually, dropping SGX from consumer chips.